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The problem of a fair distribution of resources among agents has been widely
investigated and many notions of fair allocation have been adopted to eval-
uate equity. Since its introduction by Foley [6] and Varian [14], one of the
most extensively studied concept is the one according to which an alloca-
tion is fair if it is envy free and eﬃcient. An allocation is said to be envy
free if each individual prefers to keep his bundle rather than to receive the
bundle of some other agent. It is known that in a pure exchange economy
a fair allocation always exists (see Theorem 2.3 in [14]). This is so because
any competitive allocation that results from an equal sharing of the total
initial endowment is fair. On the other hand, when production is allowed,
envy-freeness may be incompatible with eﬃciency and therefore the set of
fair allocations may be empty (see [12] and [14]). The same problem arises
when agents are asymmetrically informed at the time of contracting. Recent
papers by de Clippel [5] and Gajdos and Tallon [8] exhibit the tension be-
tween the concepts of envy-freeness and eﬃciency in models that explicitly
encompasses uncertainty. The incompatibility may occur if the allocation is
judged before or after the realization of uncertainty, as well as according to
an interim stage evaluation.
Stronger notions of equity present in the fairness literature require that
bundle comparisons are allowed between groups of agents. The pioneers of
the concept of coalitional fair (c-fair) allocations are Varian [14] and Gab-
szewicz [7]. An allocation is c-fair if no coalition envies the aggregate bundle
or the net trade of some other coalition. It comes out that c-fair allocations
are Pareto optimal. They always exist in standard models of pure exchange
economies. Moreover, despite of diﬀerences due to technical requirements
about the measures of potentially envious coalitions, c-fair allocations in-
troduced in both papers provide a complete characterization of competitive
market equilibria (see also [17] and [19] for analogous results).
In de Clippel [5], the notion of (individual) fair allocation is extended to
diﬀerential information economies, assuming that the true state of nature is
commonly known at the time of implementing contracts. This requirement
makes irrelevant incentive compatibility constraints and allows to cover sit-
uations, like payoﬀ of options or insurance contracts, that are contingent on
the realization of some observable event. An interim envy free allocation is
a redistribution of the initial resources such that there is zero probability
of an agent interim envying another. de Clippel shows that an interim fair
allocation may not exist ([5, Example 1]), addressing the issue of the incom-
patibility between eﬃciency and envy freeness in pure exchange economies
with informational asymmetries. A similar notion is introduced in [11] in a
quite diﬀerent context, to show that interim fair allocations are not imple-
1mentable.
The purpose of this paper is to identify the coalitional fairness notion as
a suitable criterion to evaluate allocations on an equitable basis when agents
are asymmetrically informed. We analyze the general case of mixed markets
in which the measure of agents may have atoms. As in [5], we assume that
the true state of nature is commonly known at the time of implementing
the contracts, focusing on interim fairness notions. We extend to diﬀeren-
tial information economies both c-fairness criteria introduced, respectively,
by Gabszewicz [7] and Varian [14]. Our goal is to provide a notion of fair-
ness which solves the conﬂict arising between eﬃciency and the absence of
envy. To this end, we ﬁrst extend to asymmetric information economies the
notions of c-fair allocations: an allocation is interim c-fair if no coalition in-
terim envies (in the sense of Varian or Gabszewicz) the bundle of any other
coalition. In the light of the negative conclusions presented in [5], we ob-
tain only partial existence results by using the notion of common knowledge
event. Indeed, we prove that it is impossible to ﬁnd two coalitions S1 and
S2 for which it is common knowledge that S1 interim envies S2. Hence, the
notions of interim coalitional fairness, that implicitly satisfy interim Pareto
eﬃciency, do not seem to furnish a suitable criterion of equity when agents
are asymmetrically informed. However, diﬀerently by individual fairness,
they allow us to adapt, in the case of envy, the alternative blocking mecha-
nism proposed by [4].
In [4], objections to a given allocation of resources emerge from coali-
tions depending on the state of nature. Unblocked allocations are interpreted
as sub game-perfect equilibrium outcomes of competitive screening games.
Under this approach, uninformed intermediaries anticipate the coalitions of
agents that are going to form to buy net trade vectors. Since agent’s deci-
sions depend on their private information, coalitions depend on the future
state of nature. With this interpretation in mind, coalitions that are going
to be formed emerge endogenously as a function of the state of nature.
Given an allocation a and an alternative allocation a ,t h es e to fd e v i a t o r s
in a given state is the set of agents that prefer to receive, given their private
information, the allocation a  instead of keeping a. We say that there is coali-
tional envy in a state under the allocation a, if there exists an alternative
allocation a  for which the set of deviators could beneﬁt from achieving the
net trade of some other disjoint coalition. Adapting the Gabszewicz’s notion
([7]) to the asymmetric information framework, an allocation is qualiﬁed c-
type fair if there is zero probability of a set of deviators interim envying the
net trade of any other coalition. Under such distribution of resources, there
does not exist an alternative allocation and a state at which, potentially,
deviators are treated in a discriminatory way by the market. According to
2the c-type fair criterion, agents in a potentially envious coalition make com-
parisons given their private information and not after the observation of the
state. Our main result shows that the set of c-type fair allocations is non-
empty.
We prove that c-type fair allocations correspond to the c-fair allocations
of an auxiliary Arrow-Debreu exchange economy with uncertainty and sym-
metric information. Agents of the auxiliary economy are deﬁned adapting
the idea used by Harsanyi [10] to deﬁne Bayesian games. A type-agent is
a couple (t,E), where t is an agent and E is an atom of his information
partition. The future state of the ﬁctitious economy is uncertain, but each
type-agent has no private information. Moreover, since contracts are contin-
gent on the future state of the economy, standard Arrow-Debreu equilibrium
notions can be applied. We adapt this representation to the case of mixed
markets, namely large exchange economies in which some agents are en-
dowed with an exceptional initial endowment of resources. Mixed market
is the natural framework to deal with coalitional fairness. We prove that
there is a natural correspondence between the original mixed market and
the auxiliary economy. A correspondence that preserves core, c-fair alloca-
tions and constrained market equilibria. This allows us to conclude that the
set of c-type fair allocations is non empty, since it contains the set of con-
strained market equilibria (see [16]). Moreover, c-type fair allocations form
a subset of the type-core deﬁned in [4]. Though inclusions relating the above
equilibrium notions are strict, additional assumptions allow to show their
convergence towards the set of constrained market equilibria.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model
describing the general framework of mixed markets. In Section 3 an extension
to diﬀerential information economies of the notion of c-fairness due to Varian
is introduced and a ﬁrst partial existence theorem is proved. In Section 4 we
introduce c-type fairness. Hence we deﬁne the ﬁctitious economy associated
to the original diﬀerential information one. Section 5 deals with the one-
to-one correspondence between both economies in terms of core, c-type fair
allocations and constrained market equilibria. We conclude proving the non
emptiness of the set of c-type fair allocations and convergence results.
2 The model
2.1 The setting
We consider a Radner like exchange economy E with uncertainty and dif-
ferential information. We refer to this economy as a mixed market since it
exhibits both an atomic and an atomless sector (see [13] and the references
3given there). The economy E is modeled by the following collection:
E =
 
(Ω,F,π); (T,T ,µ); I R 
+;( Ft,u t,e t)t∈T
 
where:
1. (Ω,F,π) is a probability space describing the exogenous uncertainty.
The set Ω is ﬁnite: Ω = {ω1,...,ω k} represents the possible states of
nature and F is the ﬁeld representing the set of all the events. The
common prior π describes the relative probability of the states. We
assume, without loss of generality, that π(ω) > 0f o re a c hω ∈ Ω.
2. (T,T ,µ) is a complete, ﬁnite measure space representing the space of
agents, where T is the set of agents, T is the σ-ﬁeld of all eligible coali-
tions, whose economic weight on the market is given by the measure
µ. An arbitrary ﬁnite measure space of agents makes us deal simul-
taneously with the case of discrete economies, non-atomic economies
as well as economies that may have atoms. Indeed, discrete economies
are covered by a ﬁnite set T w i t hac o u n t i n gm e a s u r eµ.A t o m l e s s
economies are analyzed by assuming that (T,T ,µ) is the Lebesgue
measure space with T =[ 0 ,1]. Finally, mixed markets are those for
which is composed by two sets: T0 and T1,w h e r eT0 is the atomless
sector that describes the ocean of small agents and T1 the set of atoms.
We will refer to T0 as the set of “small” traders and to T1 as the set
of “large” traders.1
3. I R 





t∈T is the set of agent’s characteristics. Each agent t ∈ T is
characterized by:
- A private information. This is described by the ﬁeld Ft generated
by a partition Πt of the set Ω. The interpretation is as usual: if
ω ∈ Ω is the state of nature that is going to be realized, agent t
observes the event Pt(ω)o fΠ t which contains ω, that is agent t
knows and only knows that it will be an element of Pt(ω). More-
over agent’s beliefs are described from π by Bayesian updating.
Given an event E⊆Ω, the probability π(ω|E)o fa n ys t a t eω
given the event E is
π({ω}∩E)
π(E)
. The true state of the economy
is common knowledge among the agents at some future date.
Let Π1,...ΠN be the partitions of the set Ω. For each i ∈{ 1,...,N},
denote by Ti the information type set deﬁned by Ti = {t ∈
1This terminology is, in particular, motivated when T is a separable metric space.
Indeed, in this case, T0 is the set of traders t ∈ T for which µ(t) = 0, while T1 is the set
of traders such that µ(t) > 0.
4T :Π t =Π i}. Throughout the paper we assume that, for every
1 ≤ i ≤ N,t h es e tTi is measurable with positive measure2.
- A state-dependent utility function representing preferences:
ut :Ω × I R 
+ → I R
(ω,x) → ut(ω,x).
The utility function of each agent is strictly increasing, continuous
and concave in each state of the economy, moreover for all ω in
Ω the mapping (t,x)  → ut(ω,x)i sT× B -measurable, where B is
the σ-ﬁeld of Borel subsets of I R 
+.
- An initial endowment of physical resources represented by the
function
et :Ω → I R 
+.
Decisions are taken today about the way to redistribute the endowments
when the state will be common knowledge. Therefore, incentive and mea-
surability constraints are irrelevant.
An allocation is a function a :Ω× T → I R 
+ and, for each t ∈ T, at = a(·,t)
represents what agent t obtains by a. An allocation a is feasible if for each






For any allocation a we denote by Vt(at) the ex ante expected utility from





while given an event E the interim expected utility of agent t for some











Deﬁnition 2.1. Af e a s i b l ea l l o c a t i o na  interim Pareto dominates an allo-
cation a if almost all agents, given their own private information, prefer a 
over a in each state, i.e.,
Vt(a 
t|Pt(ω)) >V t(at|Pt(ω))
for almost all t ∈ T and each ω ∈ Ω.
2Notice that this assumption implies that the correspondence Π : T → 2
F deﬁned by
Π(t)=Π t, has measurable graph. It means that the set GΠ = {(t,E):E∈Πt} belongs to
T⊗ B (2
F), where B(2
F) denotes the Borel σ-algebra on 2
F and ⊗ denotes the product
σ-algebra.
5A feasible allocation is interim eﬃcient (or interim Pareto optimal)i fi ti s
not interim Pareto dominated by any other feasible allocation (for a similar
deﬁnition see [18]).
The following notion of constrained market equilibrium represents a nat-
ural generalization of Arrow-Debreu equilibria to markets with asymmetric
information ([16], [4]).
Deﬁnition 2.2. An allocation a is a constrained market equilibrium if it
is feasible and there exists a price system p :Ω→ I R 
+ such that, for each
ω ∈ Ω and t ∈ T























is the budget set of agent t at ω.
We observe that a constrained market equilibrium is a feasible allocation a
for which there exists a price system such that, for each ω and for each agent
t, at maximizes the interim expected utility function on the budget set of t
at ω. The budget set of agent t depends also on the state ω, because it takes
in account only states belonging to the atom of t’s partition containing
ω. Intuitively, each agent, using only his own information, maximizes his
expected utility function under the additional constraint that he may not
sell contingent commodities associated to states that he knows are not going
to occur.
Whenever we need to require the equal distribution of initial resources,




















where e denotes the aggregate initial endowment.
The existence of a constrained market equilibrium is proved by [16] in
the case of discrete economies (see also [4, Theorem 4]). We will prove that
the existence of constrained market equilibria holds true in the general case
of mixed markets (compare Remark 5.5).
3 Motivation
The problem of a fair division of resources among agents has been widely
studied and many notions of fair allocation have been developed in diﬀerent
6economic contexts (see among the others, [3], [6], [14], [17]). One of the con-
cepts that has played a central role is due to Foley [6] and Varian [14] (see
also [15]). According to [6] and [14], an allocation is fair if it is envy free and
eﬃcient. Equitable or envy free allocations (in the sense of Varian)are those
for which each individual prefers to keep his bundle rather than to receive
the bundle of any other agent. It is proved that in a pure exchange economy,
under monotonicity and convexity assumptions on preferences, a fair alloca-
tion always exists ([14, Theorem 2.3]). On the other hand, when agents are
asymmetrically informed, envy-freeness may be incompatible with eﬃciency
and therefore the set of fair allocations may be empty. De Clippel deﬁnes
an interim fair allocation as an (interim) eﬃcient redistribution of initial
resources such that there is zero probability of an agent interim envying
another.
Deﬁnition 3.1. ([5]) An agent t interim envies an agent t  at the allocation
a in the state ω,i f
Vt(at |Pt(ω)) >V t(at|Pt(ω)).
An allocation a is: interim envy-free if there does not exists a state at which
an agent interim envies another; interim fair if it is interim envy-free and in-
terim eﬃcient. This concept generalizes the usual (individual) fairness when
uncertainty and asymmetric information are encompassed by the model. It
is possible to show that an interim fair allocation may not exist (see [5,
Example 1] and Example 3.7 below). Our goal is to provide a notion of
fairness which solves the conﬂict. To this end, we extend to asymmetric
information economies the stronger notions of equity according to which
groups of agents are allowed to make utility comparisons, as we argue that
an appropriate notion of fairness is the coalitional one. Coalitional notions
of fair were introduced by Varian [14] and Gabszewicz [7]. The two notions
diﬀer for what follow: Varian requires that a c-fair allocation must be such
that no coalition envies the aggregate bundle of any other coalition of the
same or smaller size. According to Gabszewicz’s deﬁnition, diﬀerent groups
of agents compare their net trades without any requirement on the measure
of the potentially envious coalition. In both cases, diﬀerently from individual
fairness, the eﬃciency is implicitly satisﬁed.
We ﬁrst extend to asymmetric information economies the notion of c-
fair allocations due to Varian [14]3. We say that an allocation is interim
c-fair if it is interim eﬃcient and if no coalition interim envies the bundle
of any other coalition with the same or smaller measure. Each member of
a potentially envious coalition makes bundle comparisons given his private
3Diﬀerently from the perfect information notions, we will explicitly require interim
Pareto eﬃciency due to the free disposal condition imposed on allocations. However, this
is not a restriction for the aim of this Section since the motivation relying on Example 3.7
remains valid removing the free disposal requirement.
7information. For the aim of this Section, it will enough to consider the case
of a ﬁnite exchange economy E.
Deﬁnition 3.2. A non-empty coalition S1 interim envies (in the sense of
Varian) a coalition S2 at the allocation a in the state ω,i ft h e r ee x i s t sa n
allocation a  such that
(1) µ(S1) ≥ µ(S2)
(2) Vt(a 








at(ω),f o r a l l ω ∈ Ω.
The interpretation goes as follows: We say that a coalition S1 interim envies
another one with smaller or equal measure at an allocation a in a state ω,
if each member of S1 prefers, given his private information, the bundle he
receives from the allocation a  and the commodity bundle received by S2
would allow S1 to achieve this improvement.
Deﬁnition 3.3. An allocation a is interim c-fair (in the sense of Varian)
for the economy E if it is interim eﬃcient and if there does not exist a state
at which some coalition interim envies at a another one.
Notice that in the case of perfect information, the above deﬁnition reduces
to the one given by Varian [14]. Moreover, we show in the next prpoposi-
tion that an interim c-fair allocation (in the sense of Varian) is (individual)
interim fair.
Proposition 3.4. Any interim c-fair allocation (in the sense of Varian) is
interim fair.
proof: Let a be an interim c-fair allocation and assume that a is not interim
fair. Then, there exist two agents t and t  and a state of nature ¯ ω such that
t interim envies t  at ¯ ω,t h a ti sV (ut(at )|Pt(¯ ω)) >V(ut(at)|Pt(¯ ω)).






at (·)i f r = t
at(·)i f r = t 
ar(·)i f r ∈ T \{ t,t }.
Notice that
V (ut(a 
t)|Pt(¯ ω)) = V (ut(at )|Pt(¯ ω)) >V(ut(at)|Pt(¯ ω))









8This contradicts the assumption that a is an interim c-fair allocation. 
Since the set of (individual) interim fair allocations may be empty (see [5,
Example 1]), we can conclude that Varian’s notion does not totally help
to solve the conﬂict between eﬃciency and the absence of envy. The same
problem occurs extending to asymmetric information economies the notion
of coalitional fairness due to Gabszewicz [7].
Deﬁnition 3.5. A non empty coalition S1 interim envies (in the sense of
Gabszewicz) a coalition S2 at the allocation a in the state ω,i ft h e r ee x i s t s
an allocation a  such that
(1) S1 ∩ S2 = ∅
(2) Vt(a 





t − et)(ω) ≤
 
t∈S2
(at − et)(ω),f o r a l l ω ∈ Ω.
Deﬁnition 3.6. An allocation is interim c-fair (in the sense of Gabszewicz)
for the economy E if there does not exist a state at which some coalition
interim envies another one.
Notice that this deﬁnition requires that interim c-fair allocations are interim
eﬃcient, since for S1 = T and S2 = ∅ there is no way to rearrange an
allocation in such a way that each agent is better oﬀ. Moreover it reduces to
the one given in [7] in the case of perfect information. Assuming that agents
have the same initial endowment in each state, we ﬁnd that any interim
c-fair allocation in the sense of Gabszewicz is interim fair (the argument of
Proposition 3.4 works). Both notions of coalitional fairness in models with
perfect information include competitive equilibria. More precisely, it was
proved by [14, Theorem 4.1] that equal income competitive equilibria are
c-fair in the sense of Varian and by [7, Proposition 1], that each competitive
allocation is c-fair in the sense of Gabszewicz. This desirable property of c-
fairness also fails to be true in the presence of asymmetric information. The
example below exhibits the non existence of c-fair allocations in markets
with asymmetric information as well as the fact that a constrained market
equilibrium may not be c-fair.4
Example 3.7. Consider an economy composed by three agents, one good
(money) and two diﬀerent states of nature. More precisely, the future state
may be low (ω = L)o rh i g h( ω = H) with equal probability. Agent 3 is
able to distinguish between the two states, while agents 1 and 2 are not. So
Π1 =Π 2 = {{L,H}} and Π3{{L},{H}}. Agent 1 is risk neutral, while agent
2 is risk averse. The total endowment is 1200 dollars when the state is low,
4Later we will prove that a constrained market equilibrium is c-type fair.
9it is 1800 dollars when the state is high and in each state it is equal shared
among the agents, i.e. et(L) = 400 and et(H) = 600 for each t =1 ,2,3. The
utility functions are ut(·,x)=x for t =1 ,3a n du2(·,x)=
√
x.
Then, solving the maximization problems, we get that the allocation a
deﬁned as a1(L) = 300,a 2(L) = 500,a 3(L) = 400,a 1(H) = 700,a 2(H)=
500 and a3(H) = 600 is a constrained market equilibrium with p such that
p(L)=p(H).
Moreover, a is not a fair allocation, and therefore it is not c-fair (whatever
deﬁnition is used). Indeed, imposing the condition for interim envy-freeness,
we get that the only interim envy-free allocation is a  deﬁned as a 
t(L) = 400
and a 
t(H) = 600 for each t.B u ta  is fair, since it is Pareto dominated by a  
such that a  
t(L) = 301, for t =1 ,3,a   
2(L) = 498,a   
1(H) = 701,a   
2(H) = 498
and a  
3(H) = 601. Notice that in both states L and H, there is an equal dis-
tribution of initial resources; thus even an equal income constrained market
equilibrium may not be a c-fair allocation. Therefore the incompatibilities
presented by [5] in the case of individual fairness, persist, when agents are
asymmetrically informed, with reference to fairness notions of coalitional
nature.
Following [5], a partial positive result can be obtained using the notion of
common knowledge event. We recall that an event E is common knowledge
if it can be written as a union of pairwise elements of Πt for each t ∈ T.
The following Proposition extends Varian’s positive results under the weaker
condition of common knowledge.
Theorem 3.8. There exists an interim eﬃcient allocation such that it is
impossible to ﬁnd two coalitions S1 and S2 for which it is common knowledge
that S1 interim envies S2 (in the sense of Varian).
proof: As observed in [16] the set of constrained market equilibria is non-
empty and every constrained market allocation is interim eﬃcient (see [4]).
Let a be a constrained market equilibrium with equal income. We mean
that a is a constrained market equilibrium resulting from an equal sharing
of the aggregate endowment in each state. More precisely, each agent in each
state ω maximizes his interim expected utility function subject to his equal
income budget set at ω.
Suppose that there exist a coalition S1 of positive measure and a coalition
S2 for which it is common knowledge that S1 interim envies S2, that is there
exists a common knowledge event E such that S1 interim envies S2 at each
state ω ∈E.
Thus, there exists a function a  : T × Ω → I R 
+ such that for all ¯ ω ∈E
(1) µ(S1) ≥ µ(S2)
(2) Vt(a 








at(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
10Since a is a constrained market equilibrium with equal income, from (2) it
follows that a 
t(ω) / ∈   Bt(p,ω) for all ω ∈Eand for all t ∈ S1.T h u s ,f o ra l l
t ∈ S1 and for all t  ∈ S2,
 
ω∈E
































Pt ∈Πt Pt ⊆E
 
ω∈Pt (¯ ω)




p(ω) · at (ω).
Thus, for all t ∈ S1 and for all t  ∈ S2,
 
ω∈E




p(ω) · at (ω).















This contradicts the condition (2). 
The previous theorem can be reread in the following way: any constrained
market equilibrium with equal income is (interim) eﬃcient and such that it
is impossible to ﬁnd two coalitions S1 and S2, with µ(S1) ≥ µ(S2), for which
it is common knowledge that S1 interim envies S2.
Contrary to coalitional notions introduced in this Section, we are going to
prove that extending to fairness properties the blocking mechanism proposed
by [4], the set of c-type fair allocations is non empty.
4M a i n R e s u l t s
4.1 Main Deﬁnitions
The notion of coalitional fairness that we introduce in this Section needs
the extension to the mixed market framework of the blocking mechanism
proposed by de Clippel for discrete economies with asymmetric information
(see [4]).
In [4], objections to a given allocation of resources emerge from coalitions
depending on the state of nature, as unblocked allocations are interpreted
11like sub game-perfect equilibrium outcomes of competitive screening games.
Under this interpretation, uninformed intermediaries anticipate the coali-
tions of agents that are going to form to buy net trade vectors they propose.
Since agent’s decisions depend on their private information, coalitions that
are going to be formed emerge endogenously as depending on the state of
nature.
Let a be an allocation that one can see as a potential outcome and let
a  be an alternative allocation. Denote by D(a,a ,ω)t h es e to fd e v i a t o r s
should ω be the future state of nature of the economy. It is the set of agents
that prefer, given their private information, to receive a  instead of keeping
a:
D(a, a ,ω )={t ∈ T : Vt(a 
t|Pt(ω)) >V t(at|Pt(ω))}.
Notice that by measurability assumption of the mapping (t,x)  → ut(ω,x),
the set of deviators is always measurable.
Deﬁnition 4.1. ([4]) An allocation a is said to be blocked by a  in the type-
agent sense, or, equivalently, a  is said to be strictly feasible when proposed








with a strictly inequality in at least one state of nature.
Deﬁnition 4.2. An allocation a is said to belong to the type-agent core of
E, denoted by Ctype(E), if it is feasible and if it is not blocked in the type-
agent sense.
Requiring that the inequality contained in Deﬁnition 4.1 is strict in at least
one state, it is ensured that in the state the set of deviators has positive
measure. Hence the type-agent core does not coincides with the set of all
feasible allocations. Moreover, it should be noticed that coalitions proposing
an alternative allocation in the type blocking mechanism vary over the set of
states of nature and for each state ω ∈ Ω it collects the set of all deviators.
The type-agent core coincides with the usual notion of core when there is
no uncertainty.
We remark that the terminology adopted in Deﬁnition 4.1 and Deﬁni-
tion 4.2 is justiﬁed by de Clippel’s proposal of adapting the idea of Harsanyi.
Harsanyi deﬁnes a Bayesian equilibrium to be any Nash equilibrium of the
type-agent representation of the original Bayesian game (see [10]). Thus,
as in [4], in the next Section we suggest a type-agent representation of the
mixed economy with asymmetrically informed agents.
Let us now give main deﬁnitions. We adapt the veto mechanism proposed
by [4] to the coalitional envy introduced in [7] for markets with perfect in-
formation. Notice that the adopted notion of coalitional fairness, diﬀerently
12from the one given by Varian, provides positive existence and convergence
result even without assuming the equal distribution of initial endowment
among traders.
Deﬁnition 4.3. An allocation a is said to be blocked in the c-type fair sense
by a  if for all ω ∈ Ω there exists a coalition S(a, a ,ω ) ⊆ T such that





t(ω) − et(ω)) dµ ≤
 
S(a,a ,ω)
(at(ω) − et(ω)) dµ,
with a strictly inequality in at least one state of nature.
We say that there is coalitional envy in state ω under the allocation a,
if there exist an allocation a  and a coalition S(a, a ,ω ) for which the set of
deviators D(a, a ,ω ) satisﬁes (1) and (2) above.
Notice that we do not require that S(a, a ,ω ) has positive measure.
The interpretation goes as follows: a is blocked in the c-type fair sense by
a  if in each state ω the set of deviators can redistribute among its members
the net trade of another disjoint coalition S(a,a ,ω). In this case, we say
that for each state ω, the deviators t ∈ D(a,a ,ω) envy the net trade of
coalition S(a,a ,ω).
Deﬁnition 4.4. An allocation a is c-type fair if it is feasible and it is not
blocked in the c-type fair sense. We denote by C
fair
type(E) the set of c-type fair
allocations for the economy E.
An allocation is qualiﬁed c-type fair if there is zero probability of a set of
deviators interim envying the net trade of any other coalition. Under such
distribution of resources, there does not exist an alternative allocation and
a state at which potentially deviators are treated in a discriminatory way
by the market. According to the c-type fair criterion, agents in a potentially
envious coalition make comparisons given their private information and not
after the observation of the state.
It is easy to show that any c-type fair allocation is interim eﬃcient. We
just need to put for all ω, the set of deviators equal to the whole set of agents
and the disjoint coalition equal to the empty set.
4.2 An auxiliary economy associated to a mixed market
In order to prove the existence result and the characterizations of c-type
fair allocations we need to introduce a ﬁctitious economy related to E. More
precisely, we consider a type-agent representation of the economy described
in the previous section. It is a ﬁctitious exchange economy with uncertainty
and symmetric information modeled by the following collection:
E∗ =
 




131. (Ω,F,π) the measurable space describing uncertainty has been deﬁned
before.
2. T∗ is the set of the type agents. More precisely, T∗ coincides with the
graph of the correspondence Π : T → 2F deﬁned by Π(t)=Π t, i.e. T∗
is the set of couple (t,E), where t is an agent and E is an atom of his
information partition.
T ∗ is the family of coalitions: a coalition is a measurable subset S∗ of
T∗, i.e. a subset S∗ of T∗ that belongs to T⊗ B (2F), where B(2F)d e -
notes the Borel σ-algebra on 2F and ⊗ denotes the product σ-algebra.
Finally, the measure µ∗ on T ∗ is deﬁned by µ∗(S∗)=µ(ProjTS∗)5.
3. The couple (u(t,E),e (t,E)) characterizes the type-agent (t,E). That is,
given a type-agent (t,E),u (t,E) describes his state-dependent utility
function, while e(t,E) represents his initial endowment of physical re-
sources. Formally, the couple (u(t,E),e (t,E)) is deﬁned as follows
e(t,E)(ω)=
 
et(ω)i f ω ∈E
0o t h e r w i s e .
u(t,E)(ω,α(t,E)(ω)) =
 
ut(ω,at(ω)) if ω ∈E
0o t h e r w i s e .
The type-agents decide today about the way to redistribute their endow-
ments when the state will be common knowledge. The presence of uncer-
tainty in this economy, as well as the possibility of writing contracts that
are contingent on the future state of the economy, allows us to apply the
standard notion of competitive, core and c-fair allocations. We shall rewrite,
for reader convenience, the main equilibrium notions in the economy E∗.
An allocation in the ﬁctitious economy is a function α :Ω× T∗ → I R 
+
and, for each (t,E) ∈ T∗,α (t,E) :Ω→ I R 
+ represents the bundle that the
type-agent (t,E) receives under the allocation α.






e(t,E)(ω)dµ∗ for all ω ∈ Ω.
Deﬁnition 4.5. Let S∗ be a coalition with positive measure, i.e. µ∗(S∗) > 0.
An allocation α  Pareto dominates α for S∗ if for almost all (t,E) ∈ S∗
V(t,E)(α 
(t,E)) >V (t,E)(α(t,E)).
5Since the measure space of agents is assumed to be ﬁnite and complete, the measur-
ability of the projection Proj TS
∗ follows by the Projection Theorem (see [1, Theorem
14.84])
14Deﬁnition 4.6. The core of the economy E∗ is the set of feasible allocations
for T∗ such that there do not exist a coalition S∗ and an allocation α  feasible
for S∗ that Pareto dominates α for S∗.
Deﬁnition 4.7. An allocation α is c-fair blocked by an assignment α  if























(α(t,E)(ω) − e(t,E)(ω))dµ∗ for all ω∈ Ω.
Deﬁnition 4.8. An allocation α is c-fair for E∗ if it is feasible and it is
not c-fair blocked by any other allocation.
Deﬁnition 4.9. An allocation α is an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium in the
type-agent representation of the economy E∗ if it is feasible for T∗ and there
exists a price system p :Ω→ I R 
+ such that




















5 One to one correspondence between E and E∗
In this section we construct a natural isomorphism between equilibrium
allocations of the economy E and of the type-agent representation E∗. We
observe that the following one-to-one correspondence is an extension to the
general framework of mixed markets of the isomorphism used in de Clippel
(2007).
G i v e na na l l o c a t i o na ∈ E, its type-agent representation is the allocation α
such that for each (t,E)i nT∗
α(t,E)(ω)=at(ω)χE(ω).
Given an allocation α ∈ E∗, its associated allocation a in the original econ-
omy E is such that for each t in T and each ω in Ω
at(ω)=α(t,Pt(ω))(ω).
What we prove in the next subsections is the invariance, under the above
deﬁned correspondence, of the main allocations properties we are investigat-
ing.
155.1 Feasibility invariance
Proposition 5.1. If a is a feasible allocation for E, then the corresponding
allocation α is feasible.
Conversely, if α is a feasible allocation for E∗, then the corresponding allo-
cation a is feasible for E.













which, in turn, it is equivalent to
 
T∗
α(t,Pt(¯ ω))(¯ ω)dµ ∗ ≤
 
T∗
e(t,Pt(¯ ω))(¯ ω)dµ ∗
that is  
T∗






Theorem 5.2. If an allocation a belongs to the type-agent core of the econ-
omy E, then the corresponding allocation α is in the core of the economy
E∗.
C o n v e r s e l y ,i fa na l l o c a t i o nα belongs to the core of E∗, then the associated
allocation a is a type-core allocation for E.
proof: Let a be a type-agent core allocation for E, then it is feasible as the
corresponding allocation α in E∗ (see Proposition 5.1). Assume contrary to
the statement that α is not in the core of E∗. This means that there exist
an assignment α
 
and a coalition S∗,w i t hµ∗(S∗) > 0, such that for almost


















e(t,E)(ω)dµ∗, forallω ∈ Ω.
Without loss of generality we can assume that, for all (t,E) ∈ T∗,
α 
(t,E)(ω) = 0 for all ω/ ∈E.






(t,Pt(ω))(ω)i f ( t,Pt(ω)) ∈ S∗
0o t h e r w i s e .
Notice that for all ω ∈ Ω,
t ∈ D(a, a ,ω ) if and only if (t,Pt(ω)) ∈ S∗.























We can observe that if a  is not strictly feasible when proposed against a,
then one can slightly modify a as follows.
From continuity of utility function there exist a state ¯ ω, ε ∈ (0,1) and
S(a,a , ¯ ω) ⊆ D(a,a , ¯ ω) such that for almost all t ∈ S(a,a , ¯ ω),
Vt(εa 
t|Pt(¯ ω)) >V t(at|Pt(¯ ω)).





t(¯ ω)i f ω =¯ ω and t ∈ S(a,a , ¯ ω)
a 
t(ω)o t h e r w i s e .
Then it is easy to see that for each ω in Ω
D(a, a  ,ω )=D(a, a ,ω ).
Thus, for every ω,
 






























D(a,a , ¯ ω)
et(¯ ω)dµ =
 
D(a, a  , ¯ ω)
et(¯ ω)dµ.
17This contradicts the assumption that a is a type-agent core allocation.
Conversely, let α be a core allocation for E∗, then it is feasible as the
corresponding allocation a (see Proposition 5.1). Suppose that a is not in
the type-agent core. This means that there exists an assignment a  such that








with a strictly inequality in at least one state of nature. Hence there exists
at least one state such that the corresponding set of deviators has positive
measure.
Deﬁne the subset S∗ of T∗ as follows









D(a, a ,ω ) ∩ Ti
 
×{ Πi(ω)}
hence S∗ is a coalition with positive measure. Moreover, for each state ¯ ω,
(t,Pt(¯ ω)) ∈ S∗ if and only if t ∈ D(a,a , ¯ ω).





t(ω)i f ω ∈Eand (t,E) ∈ S∗
0o t h e r w i s e























This contradicts the assumption that α is a core allocation for E∗. 
185.3 Type fairness correspondence
Theorem 5.3. If a is a c-type fair allocation for E, then the corresponding
allocation α is c-fair for E∗
Conversely, if α is a c-fair allocation for E∗, then the corresponding alloca-
tion a is c-type fair for E.
proof: Let a be a c-type fair allocation for E and assume on the contrary
that the corresponding allocation α ∈ E∗ is not c-fair. This means that there























(α(t,E)(ω) − e(t,E)(ω)) dµ∗ for all ω ∈ Ω.
Notice that without loss of generality we can assume that for all (t,E) ∈ T∗,
α 
(t,E)(ω) = 0 for all ω/ ∈E.





(t,Pt(ω))(ω)i f ( t,Pt(ω)) ∈ S∗
1
0o t h e r w i s e .
We can notice that for each ω ∈ Ω,
t ∈ D(a, a ,ω ) if and only if (t,Pt(ω)) ∈ S∗
1.
Deﬁne for each ﬁxed state ω ∈ Ω, the set
S2(a, a ,ω )={t ∈ T :( t,Pt(ω)) ∈ S∗
2}.
Then S2(a, a ,ω ) is a measurable subset of T, since it coincides with the
projection over T of the measurable subset of T∗ deﬁned by S∗
2 ∩{(t,Πt(ω):














(α(t,E)(ω) − e(t,E)(ω)) dµ∗ =
 
S2(a, a ,ω)
(at(ω) − et(ω)) dµ.
As in Theorem 5.2, we observe that if a  is such that there is no ω for which
the previous inequality is strict we can consider a new allocation a  .
19From continuity of utility function there exist a state ¯ ω, ε ∈ (0,1) and
S1(a,a , ¯ ω) ⊆ D(a,a , ¯ ω) such that for almost all t ∈ S1(a,a , ¯ ω),
Vt(εa 
t|Pt(¯ ω)) >V t(at|Pt(¯ ω)).





t(ω)i f t ∈ S1(a,a , ¯ ω)a n dω =¯ ω
a 
t(ω)o t h e r w i s e
Then, for each ω, D(a, a  ,ω )=D(a, a ,ω )a n d
 






where we can deﬁne, for each ω, S2(a, a  ,ω )=S2(a, a ,ω ).
Moreover,
 
D(a,a  , ¯ ω)
(a  
t(¯ ω) − et(¯ ω)) dµ =
 
D(a,a , ¯ ω)
(a  
t(¯ ω) − et(¯ ω)) dµ =
=
 
D(a,a , ¯ ω)\S1(a, a , ¯ ω)
(a 
t(¯ ω) − et(¯ ω)) dµ +
 
S1(a,a , ¯ ω)
(εa 
t(¯ ω) − et(¯ ω)) dµ <
<
 
D(a, a , ¯ ω)
(a 
t(¯ ω)−et(¯ ω)) dµ ≤
 
S2(a, a , ¯ ω)
(at(¯ ω)−et(¯ ω)) dµ =
 
S2(a,a  , ¯ ω)
(at(¯ ω)−et(¯ ω)) dµ.
This contradicts the assumption that a is c-type fair.
We are now ready to prove the converse. Let α be a c-fair allocation for
E∗ and assume on the contrary that the corresponding allocation a is not
c-type fair. This means that there exists an assignment a  such that for all
ω ∈ Ω, there exists a coalition S2(a, a ,ω )f o rw h i c h









with a strictly inequality in at least one state of nature.
Consider the following subsets of T∗
S∗
1 = {(t,E) ∈ T∗ such that Vt(a 
t|E) >V t(at|E)},
S∗
2 = {(t,E) ∈ T∗ such that t ∈ S2(a, a , ¯ ω)w i t h¯ ω ∈E} .
























2 are measurable, µ∗(S∗
1) > 0, while S∗
2 may also be the
empty coalition. Moreover, we can observe that S∗
1 and S∗
2 are disjoint and,
given a state ω, (t,Pt(ω)) ∈ S∗
1 if and only if t ∈ D(a, a ,ω ).






t(ω)i f ω ∈Eand (t,E) ∈ S∗
1
0o t h e r w i s e


























(α(t,E)(ω) − e(t,E)(ω)) dµ∗.
This contradicts the assumption that α is a c-fair allocation for E∗. 
5.4 Equilibria correspondence
Theorem 5.4. If a is a constrained market equilibrium for E, then the
associated allocation α is an Arrow Debreu equilibrium for E∗.
Conversely, if α is an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium for E∗, then the associated
allocation a is a constrained market equilibrium for E.
proof: Let a be a constrained market equilibrium. Then α is feasible.
Let p be the price system supporting a as constrained market equilibrium.
Let (t,E) ∈ T ×F. Since at ∈ Bt(p,ω)f o re a c hω in E,t h e nα(t,E) ∈ B(t,E)(p).
Let α 
(t,E) ∈ B(t,E)(p). Given the preferences of type-agent (t,E), we may
assume that α 
(t,E)(ω)=0f o re a c hω in Ω \E . Let ω ∈Eand let a 
t be
deﬁned as follows a 
t(¯ ω)=α 
(t,Pt(ω))(¯ ω)f o re a c h¯ ω ∈ Ω. Then a 
t ∈ Bt(p,ω)
and hence Vt(a 
t|Pt(ω))  Vt(at|Pt(ω)). Hence, it is easy to conclude that
V(t,E)(α 
(t,E))  V(t,E)(α(t,E)).
21Conversely, let α be a Arrow Debreu equilibrium. Then a is feasible.
Let p be the price system supporting α as Arrow Debreu equilibrium. Let
t ∈ T and let ω ∈ Ω. Since α(t,Pt(ω)) ∈ B(t,Pt(ω))(p), then at ∈ Bt(p,ω).
Let a 
t ∈ Bt(p,ω)a n dα 
(t,Pt(ω)) deﬁned as α 
(t,Pt(ω))(¯ ω)=a 
t(¯ ω)f o re a c h
¯ ω ∈ Pt(ω)a n dα 
(t,Pt(ω))(¯ ω)=0f o re a c h¯ ω ∈ Ω \ Pt(ω). Then α 
(t,Pt(ω)) ∈
B(t,Pt(ω))(p). Hence Vt(a 
t|Pt(ω))  Vt(at|Pt(ω)). 
Remark 5.5. It should be noted that Theorem 5.4 implies the existence of
constrained market equilibria in the general case of mixed markets. Indeed,
competitive equilibria of mixed markets are in a one-to-one correspondence
with equilibria of suitable atomless economies (see [13] for the case of asym-
metric information models). Hence the existence of Arrow-Debreu equilibria
of atomless economies joint with Theorem 5.4 implies that a constrained
market equilibrium always exists even in mixed markets with asymmetric
information. This result also guarantees that Theorem 3.8 can be extended
to the case of atomic economies.
5.5 Main results
The objective of this ﬁnal Section is to study relations among type-allocations
and, in particular, the relation between constrained market equilibria and c-
type fair allocations. We will show that in a mixed market in which agents are
asymmetrically informed at the time of contracting, the set of constrained
market allocations is contained in the set of c-type fair allocations which it-
self is contained in the type-core. These inclusions may be strict. This is the
case of economies in which, despite of the existence of an atomless sector,
the type-core does not converge to the set of constrained market equilibria.




proof: Let a be an allocation which is blocked in the type-core sense by an
assignment a . Putting for all ω ∈ Ω, the coalition S(a,a ,ω) equal to the
empty set, we get the conclusion. 
The correspondence between the economy E and its type representation
implies the following result.
Theorem 5.7. Any constrained market equilibrium is a c-type fair alloca-
tion.
proof: Let a be a constrained market equilibrium, then the associated al-
location α is an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium of the economy E∗.S i n c ea n y
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is a c-fair allocation (see [7, Prposition 1], then
22α is c-fair for the economy E∗ and hence, from Theorem 5.3, it follows that
a is c-type fair for E. 
Theorem 5.8. Suppose that almost all agents are endowed with a strictly
positive amount of each good in each state of the economy. Then the set of
c-type fair allocations is non-empty.
proof: It is a direct consequence of Theorem 5.7 and the existence of an
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium (see Remark 5.5). 
Theorem 5.8 proves that assuming, contrary to the analysis of Section 3.3,
that objections are not bound to emerge from state-independent coalitions,
then the notion of coalitional fairness is not vacuous. Coalitional fairness
solves the tension that might be between eﬃciency and the absence of envy
that is proved by non existence result due to [5]. First we identify mixed
markets as a natural framework to study fair resource distributions. Indeed,
such models embody a large number of traders some of which are endowed
with an exceptional initial bundle. In this setting, coalitions, rather than
individuals, are the primitive entities that are naturally called to compare
discriminatory distribution of resources. The idea of replacing potentially
envious individuals by coalitions allows us to assume, following the veto
mechanism proposed by [4], that coalitions are endogenously determined by
comparing diﬀerent allocation rules.
Remark 5.9. The relation contained in Theorem 5.6 would allow us to
state a result similar to [4, Theorem 2]: The set of c-type fair allocations
is a subset of the coarse core deﬁned by Wilson (see [16]). This result is
not surprising even though we assume no communication and information
transmission, as the veto mechanism supporting fairness criterion can be
interpreted via competitive screening games.
In the mixed market framework, the set of c-type fair allocations and the
type-core may diﬀer. Indeed, in a model with just one state of nature, the
type core coincides with the classical core, c-type fair allocations coincide
with c-fair allocations. Thus we can use the example given by Gabszewicz
([7, Proposition 2]) to say that there may exists an allocation that is in the
type core, which is not c-type fair. This allocation discriminates between
coalitions in the class T 6. The same example shows that c-type fair alloca-
tions may diﬀer from the set of constrained market equilibria when the set
of atoms is non-empty (and in particular, in the case of ﬁnite economies).
6In the case of mixed market with perfect information, even though c-fairness cannot
be extended to the whole class T of coalitions, it can be proved for smaller classes. This
is possible, as proved by [7, Theorem 2], when any allocation in the core is a restricted
competitive equilibrium. In this case, one obtains at least that core allocations do not
discriminate between a coalition made by small traders and a coalition containing all
large traders and vice versa (see also [9]).
23Diﬀerently, in atomless economies, applying the Core-Walras equivalence
theorem due to Aumann in the type agent representation, we get a charac-
terization of c-fair allocations in terms of type core and constrained market
equilibria.
Theorem 5.10. Let E be an atomless economy. Suppose that almost all
agents are endowed with a strictly positive amount of each good in each
state of the economy. Then the set of constrained market equilibria and the
set of c-type fair allocations coincide.
proof: It has been already proved that any constrained market equilibrium
is c-type fair and that c-type fair allocations are in the type core. Let a be
a type core allocation for E and assume that a cannot be supported as a
constrained market equilibrium. Therefore, by Theorem 5.4, the associated
allocation α is not an Arrow Debreu equilibrium for E∗. The Core-Walras
equivalence Theorem for atomless economies (see [2]) guarantees that α
is not a core allocation and hence it is not a type core allocation (recall
Theorem 5.2). 
As a consequence of the above theorem, we can conclude that, whenever T1 is
empty, under the assumptions which guarantee the Core-Walras Equivalence
Theorem, the type core coincides with the set of c-type fair allocations.
This conclusion conﬁrms the idea that mixed markets are the most natural
framework to study the notion of coalitional fairness.
On the other hand, whereas E is a ﬁnite economy, if we replicate the
economy E inﬁnitely many times, we get again the equivalence between
coalitional fairness and the set of constrained market equilibria, as the fol-
lowing theorem illustrates.
The economy E with asymmetric information can be replicated as in [4].
For each agent t, the agent (t,k)i nt h er-replica of E for each k =1 ,...r,
has the same information and the same utility function of agent t.O b s e r v e
also that the type-agent representation of each replica of the economy E
coincides with the Debreu-Scarf replication of the type-agent representation
E∗ of E.
Theorem 5.11. Suppose that each agent’s utility function is strictly con-
cave in each state of the economy and that each agent is endowed with a
strictly positive amount of each good in each state of the economy. Then
the set of c-type fair allocations shrinks to the set of constrained market
equilibria as the number of replicas tends to inﬁnity.
proof: The proof follows fron [4, Theorem 6] 
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